Abstract-This paper presents a method that eases the design of the operational architecture of a control system by providing, from the knowledge of some characteristics of the functions that the control system must ensure and a generic model of controller, an assignment solution of these functions that satisfies capabilities and distribution constraints. This method relies on the verification of a reachability property on a network of communicating automata that models the assignment process. The benefit of this proposal is illustrated by a non-trivial case study from industry.
I. INTRODUCTION
Whatever the process, the operational control architecture of an industrial process is composed of several controllers (PLCs or real-time industrial computers) which gather in formation from the process through sensors, execute the functions that are required to control correctly the process (physical parameters regulation, tasks synchronization, oper ation modes management, ) and generate signals towards the process. A controller is then a physical device that permits to implement one or several control functions by providing the necessary hardware resources and in particular logic and analogic interfaces from/to the process.
Moreover, for critical processes like for instance power production and distribution, several kinds of controllers with different integrity levels are to be used to build the opera tional architecture. Safety-related functions must indeed be implemented in controllers with a high integrity level, with several internal redundancies, while implementation of less critical functions requires controllers with lower integrity levels.
Design of the operational control architecture of a critical process requires then to assign all the necessary control functions to controllers, while satisfying constraints that are related to:
• the capabilities (numbers of the different kinds of re sources) of the controllers;
• the distribution of functions, because two functions may or may not be combined into a single controller according to their safety levels.
In the current industrial practice, the assignment of func tions to controllers is performed in a non-automated way, This proposal is based on the verification of a reachability property in a discrete state space. Such an approach has been already used successfully in [1] and [2] . This con tribution differs from these two references because time is not considered in an assignment problem. It should be also emphasized that this work constitutes a prerequisite for the evaluation of the time performances of the operational archi tecture. The results obtained in this field by using simulation techniques ([3] , [4] , [5] ), formal verification [6] , or algebraic approaches [7] , assume indeed that the processing times of the controllers are known, which of course requires that all functions have been previously assigned.
The paper is organized as follows. The elements of the problem (control functions, controllers, and assignment constraints) are formally defined in Section II. Section III describes the way to obtain automatically an assignment solution by reachability analysis, while the implementation of this principle by using a formal verification tool is detailed in Section IV. The value of this contribution is shown in Section V thanks to two cases studies: a simple case with an illustrative purpose, and a larger one to emphasize scalability.
Prospects for further work are given in Section VI.
II. MODELLING OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE

PROBLEM
This section aims at presenting all the notations used and at illustrating the assignment process on a toy example. The following assumptions are retained for this study:
• a controller can host between 0 to n functions, as long as the assignment constraints are met;
• a function must be assigned to one and only one controller;
• a function cannot be decomposed into smaller ones;
• there is no hierarchy of functions.
A. Notations used
Let F be the set of functions fi, with i E {I, .. , L} and C the set of controllers cj, with i E { I, .. ,M}, Land ME N*. The assignment of the function i to the controller cj will be denoted by c j f-fi.
1) Fo rmal definition of a function: A function fi E F is defined as a 5-tuple (SLi,Nlf,NI�,NOLNO�) with:
• SLi E SL (Safety Level); the lower the safety level is, the more critical the function is. In the sequel of this paper, the functions are ranked in four levels; hence, the set SL is SL = {1,2,3,4}; 2) Fo rmal definition of a controller: A controller cj E C is defined as a 5-tuple (CF j , LI�ax,AI�ax, LO�ax,AO�axJ with:
• CF j E CF (Criticality Factor) 1, the lower the criticality factor is, the more reliable the controller is; the initial value (when no function is assigned to controller cj) of CFj is 0, Vi. CFj is changed during the assignment process while respecting the distribution constraints given in 3;
• LI�ax,AI�ax E N maximum numbers of respectively logic and analogic input interfaces of the controller; 2) constraints on distribution of functions.
• capabilities constraints ; Let:
-F j = {i E Flcj f-fi} be the set of functions fi which are assigned to c j ; -I j ={iE {I, ... ,L}lc j f-fi}.
I This feature is also termed Integrity Level.
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Then the following four conditions must hold:
Vi E { I, ... ,M} E Nlf ::; LI� ax (1) i Elj E NI� ::; AI� ax (2) i Elj E NO; ::; LO� ax (3) i Elj E NO� ::; AO� ax (4) i Elj -only safety level I functions, its criticality factor is then equal to I;
-safety level 2 and 3 functions only, its criticality factor is then equal to 2; safety level 3 and 4 functions only, its criticality factor is then equal to 3.
The relation 9\ is then defined as follows:
This relation is depicted graphically in figure 2.
SL CF
Fig. 2. Relation between Safety Level and Criticality Factor
B. Illustration of the assignment of functions
This toy example is based on a set of five functions f1,j 2 ,j3,j4,j5, whose safety level is in {1,2} C SL, and which are defined as follows:
These functions have to be assigned on a set of three controllers cl , c 2 , c3, whose capabilities are the same: \:fj E {1,2,3},LI�ax =AI�ax = LO�ax =AO�ax = 10
One possible assignment of these functions to the three controllers is described in Figure 3 . This solution was obtained by first assigning the function fl to the controller cl, thus fixing the value of its criticality factor to CF I = 2. The function f 2 was then assigned to the controller c 2 , thus fixing the value of its criticality factor to CF 2 = 1. Then the function f3 was assigned to the controller c l because its safety level is consistent with CF I = 2 and the sums of the numbers of inputs/outputs of the two functions do not exceed the capabilities of the controller. The function f4 was then assigned to the controller c3 because the sums of logic and analogic inputs of functions P and f4 are beyond the capabilities of the controller c 2 . The function f5 was finally assigned to controller c 2 , because the remaining capabilities of the controller c3 were too small for f5 be assigned to it.
It should be noted that this solution is not unique. As the controllers have the same numbers of inputs/outputs, other satisfactory solutions can be obtained through a circular permutation of controllers or simply by swapping two con trollers. These solutions are equivalent to the one detailed above, provided no other constraint is introduced.
--f-;J. Logic VO � Analogic VO Fig. 3 . Example of assignment of five functions to three controllers
III. METHOD PROPOSED
The method proposed for the automatic assignment of functions is based on two principles:
• modelling the assignment problem as a set of compet ing question-response mechanisms between models, in the form of communicating automata, of assignment requests and of requests acceptances;
• investigating whether the execution of this set, which is a network of communicating automata, can lead to a state reachable from the initial state where all functions are assigned.
This section first presents the formalism used to construct the request and acceptance models, which are then detailed.
The state of the network of automata characterizing the assignment of all functions is then defined, which allows to state the reachability property searched.
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A. Definition of the formalism used
The formalism used is a network of automata communicat ing through shared variables and synchronized by transition labels.
An automaton A is a N-tuple A = (S, X, L, T, Sm, so, vo),
where:
• S is a finite set of locations;
• X is a set of n integer variables;
• L is a set of labels which can be decomposed into three disjoint sets Li, Lo, L" where -Li is the set of reception labels; -Lo is the set of emission labels; -L, is the set of local labels (internal labels of an automaton).
• T is a set of transitions (s, l,g,m,
where G is the set of guards (conditions on the variables of X) and M is the set of updates on the valuations of variables;
• Sm is a set of marked locations;
• So is the initial location;
• Vo is the initial valuation of variables.
A trace (or execution) of A is a succession of evolutions from the initial state: (so, vo) � (S l , V I ) � (S 2 , V 2 )." � (s n , v n ) .
A network of automata NA = A I IIA 2 11 ... IIAn is defined as NA = (S,X,L,T,Sm,so,vO), with: • an evolution occurs in one of the automata by firing a transition t containing a local label, the guard being satisfied;
• two transitions tr, te of a pair of automata (A a ,A i3 ) with tr containing the label lr E La and te containing the label Ie E Li3 such that lr = Ie are fired simultaneously, the guards of these transitions being satisfied. • the initial locations are indicated by a source arc;
• the marked locations are indicated by two concentric circles;
• the location names are in bold;
• the label names are in italics and followed by an ! (resp. 7) for emission (resp. reception) labels;
• the variables updates are underlined.
Moreover, the guards which are always true and the internal labels are not shown for brevity.
1) Assignment request model:
The initial location of the model is 'Function not assigned'. Only one transition, which corresponds to the emission of an assignment request can be fired from this location. Once this request has been emitted, the model waits (in the location ' Assignment Possible?') for the response from an acceptance model, which can be:
• Refusal, then the model returns to the initial location;
• Ok, then the model evolves to the location "Function assigned" which is a terminal marked location. 
(8)
(10)
15
• The second transitIOn whose guard is termed 'First assignment' represents the acceptance of a request whereas no other function has been previously assigned to the controller (guard 'First assignment' true). This guard is true iff conditions (6) to (9) are satisfied and:
The variables LNII; LNI�; LNO!; LNO�, are then
updated and the criticality factor CF j is set to the value of the safety level of the function if this level is smaller than 4 for SL k = 4 then CF j is set to 3.
• The third transition whose guard is termed ' Additional assignment' represents the acceptance of a request whereas at least one other function has been previously assigned (guard 'Additional assignment' true). This guard is true if all conditions (6) to (10) are satisfied. Only the variables:
updated. The criticality factor CF j remains unchanged. In the latter two cases, the label Ok is emitted. Figure   4 as there are functions,
• M instances (a 1 ) a2 ) ... ) aM) of the model in Figure 5 ; the choice of M will be discussed in Section IV.
A synchronous evolution of two automata is possible only if these two automata emit and receive one of the following label pairs:
• Request! and Request?;
• Ok! and Ok?; To avoid inconsistencies such as the fact that an instance ai emits a reply to an instance oj which is not the one having emitted the assignment request, the question-response mechanism must be designed as a critical section protected by a semaphore. The achievement of this critical section is described in figure 6 with the semaphore 'Lock'.
An instance oj can emit a request only when Lock is equal to zero. As this Boolean variable is set by an instance ai when it receives a request and reset when it emits the response (Refusal or Ok) to this request, the question response mechanism between an instance Ok and an instance ai cannot be interrupted, i.e. only these two instances may be involved in the assignment process from the emission of the request to the response.
D. Definition of the reachability property searched
All the functions are assigned when the marked location is reached in all the instances of O. In this case, the active location of the instances of a may be the terminal location 16 or the initial location, which are both marked. Hence, the reachability property to check can be informally stated as follows:
From the initial state, is it possible to reach a state of the network of automata such that the active location is a marked location in all the automata of the network?
IV. IMP LEMENTAT ION WITH A FORMAL VERIFICATION TOOL
A. Finding a solution
The techniques of formal verification by model checking [8] aim to prove that a model satisfies or does not satisfy a formal property, which may be a reachability property. It is hence natural to consider the implementation of the method
proposed by using such a technique. This requires first to formally state the property searched, given in textual way in the previous section. Using the quantifiers of the CTL temporal logic, this property, noted P, can be written:
P: EF Full assignment Full assignment designating the state of the network such that the active location is a marked location for all automata.
This property is verified if there exists at least one trace from the initial state of the network which reaches the state Full assignment.
The search for an assignment solution can be performed by proving that the network of automata NA satisfies the above property, which will be noted: NA F P. This proof obviously depends on the number M of instances of a. properties on timed models does not constitute a selection criterion, as the communicating automata considered in this work are not timed.
In the following case studies, the UPPAAL parameters have been set so that reachability analysis be done depth first to fasten analysis. proposed. This contribution is based on reachability analysis in a network of communicating automata which models the assignment process. The treatment of a non-trivial example, by using a common verification tool has shown scalability of this proposal.
Ongoing works are aiming at introducing new capabilities and distribution constraints and to propose not only one assignment solution but a set of solutions. Comparison to other methods, like integer linear programming, is also planned on the basis of several case studies.
